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POSTURE VERSUS PRESENCE
The Relationship between Global Naval Engagement and
Naval War-Fighting Posture
Robert C. Rubel

T

here has occurred of late a controversy of sorts regarding the vector of
investment by the U.S. Navy. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter overruled
certain aspects of the Navy’s fiscal year 2016 budget, directing funds away from
presence-related items such as the littoral combat ship (LCS) and toward highend combat capabilities such as the F-35.1 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
Admiral John Richardson categorized the ensuing debate about the functions of
presence versus high-end military posture as a “false choice,” asserting that the
Navy must provide both in a balanced manner.2 However, in an era of budget
squeezes, marginal trade-offs meant to solve the problem, such as Carter’s Navy
budget alterations, could result in a Navy that will be able to provide neither to
a sufficient degree. Decisions on “fleet design” should be informed by an understanding of the relationship between forward engagement, in all its forms, and
combat posture.3 Regarding these two functional elements of the Navy’s mission
as either mutually exclusive or having a primary/collateral relationship is a recipe
for strategic error.
Naval officers traditionally have viewed war-fighting readiness and dispersed
presence as conflicting strategic functions. This view goes all the way back to
Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote:
Police duty, it was called, and quite accurately, for the distribution was that of police,
not that of a military organization calculated for military use. So American ships, and
those of other nations, were dotted singly around the world, in separate ports; with
single beats, like that of a policeman.
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How changed present conditions, how entirely concentration—which is military—
has taken the place of dispersion, it is needless to insist. This is the effect of Naval
Strategy, adapted to changes in conditions.4

For most of the post–World War II history of the U.S. Navy, the issue of warfighting readiness versus presence essentially was moot because fleet size was
large enough and geopolitical conditions were such that the two functions were
carried out adequately and appropriately by the array of large combatants that
constituted the fleet. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, fleet size
began to shrink as a result of the “peace dividend,” and after the 9/11 attacks the
geopolitical character of the world changed.
These were tectonic shifts for the Navy, and the previously mooted question
of presence versus war-fighting posture became relevant again. The tension was
illustrated by a disagreement that arose in 2005 between the Commander, Fleet
Forces, Admiral John Nathman, and the Deputy CNO for Operations and Strategy, Vice Admiral John Morgan.5 At the time, two Middle East wars, the requirement to secure the homeland from terrorist attack, and a progressively shrinking
fleet were putting enormous pressure on the Navy. CNO Admiral Mike Mullen
was searching for some new strategic recipe to reconcile and accommodate all
the demands.
Admiral Morgan devised what he called the “3/1” strategy, which was really
a template for fleet design. He depicted it as a sort of Venn diagram, with a large
circle labeled “Major Contingency Operations” representing war-fighting readiness. On the perimeter of the circle he positioned three smaller circles, labeled
“Global War on Terror,” “Shaping,” and “Homeland Defense.” These circles only
partly overlaid the big circle, implying that these missions required forces that
were not suitable for high-end combat—smaller, cheaper, and thus more numerous units that could generate more widespread presence, among other things.
Admiral Nathman disagreed with the depiction, and in his subsequent briefings showed a slide that moved the smaller circles completely within the large
one, implying that the forces designed for combat could perform these other missions as a collateral duty. Nathman’s logic was that if the Navy’s budget is tightly
constrained, such that a choice between presence and war-fighting capability is
forced, then war fighting gets the priority. Secretary Carter’s modification of the
Navy’s budget indicates that this outlook is still held by at least some leaders in
the Department of Defense, if not by many in the Navy itself.
However, that logic is a bit too simplistic for today’s world. The United States
does not face a single global competitor as it did during the Cold War, and threats
to both the homeland and American strategic interests around the world are far
more diverse and varied than at any time in the past. Conventional forces are
neither numerous enough nor suitable for addressing all the different threats that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/5
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confront the nation. The United States needs help from other countries if it is to
maintain a favorable world order—help at almost all levels of conflict. Constricting the Navy to a unilateral conventional combat design will compromise its
ability to conduct the global engagement necessary to create the interoperability
as well as the trust and confidence needed to obtain that help.
THE ENGAGEMENT LAYER CAKE
The premise of this article is that there is a positive relationship between international naval engagement and a robust war-fighting posture. That relationship is
neither simple nor easy nor straightforward. However, the framework for it can
be depicted with some clarity via the metaphor of a multitiered cake, each higher
layer having a smaller diameter than the one below, with diameter denoting the
number of nations participating. Our cake will consist of five layers, as shown in
the figure, starting at the top and working down.
The first thing to note is that the prospects for wide international cooperation
decrease at each higher level of conflict, with war fighting that involves major
powers featuring either few or no allies. The Navy’s 2007 strategy document entitled “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” or CS21, established
the lowest layer—routine maritime security in defense of the global system of
commerce and security—as a universal mission.6 However, it also said that in
times of crisis trust and confidence cannot be surged; they must be built progressively day by day. If the United States and its Navy do this well, then the hopedfor effect is that the diameter of the upper layers will expand: the United States
will have more potential coalition partners available. Of course, not every nation
has the means to join in major naval operations, but this is not necessary to expand the layer. Supporting functions such as allowing overflights or providing
basing or simply political support
can improve the Navy’s prospects
High-End
War Fighting
in combat significantly. These are
national policy issues, but a strong
naval relationship can have a posiCrisis among Major Powers
tive influence.
The 9/11 attacks demonstrated
Regional Crisis among Small States
that terrorists can do serious damage to the nation; the economic and
political disruptions of the 2001 atDisaster Response and Peacekeeping
tacks are being felt still. Whereas in
the past the threat to the homeland
Routine Maritime Security Operations
was from either nuclear or conventional military forces of another
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nation, now terrorism constitutes the main worry. However, whatever the military outcomes achieved in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other places, there still
exists the inherent danger of some previously unknown terrorist organization
mounting a 9/11-style attack. The air transportation system has been substantially secured, but the nation’s coastline is extensive and the continued flow of
illegal drugs into the country via the sea serves notice that maritime security
requires continuing attention. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks the Navy and Coast
Guard engaged in considerable planning and gaming to concoct a strategy for
securing America’s coastline. It quickly became clear to both services that there
were not enough forces to adopt a patrolling strategy. After several years of working the issue, the only solution that presented itself was a global partnership for
maritime security among as many world navies as possible. Information sharing,
lubricated by trust and confidence built through routine and repeated peacetime
engagement, was key to its effectiveness. However, the invasion of Iraq generated
a lot of international discomfort with and resentment toward the United States,
making the securing of such cooperation problematic.
The 2007 CS21, while pitched as a comprehensive new national maritime
strategy, had an underlying purpose (intended or not) that was relatively narrow:
to help engender a global maritime partnership that would reduce the chances
that terrorists could use the seas as avenues of attack on the homeland of the
United States or those of friendly nations.7 The document called for concentrating “combat credible” forces in the Middle East and Far East, and distributing
“mission tailored” forces around the world to conduct engagement and cultivate
the global maritime security partnership. A key tenet of the document was that,
as mentioned above, trust and confidence among navies must be built patiently
day by day and cannot be “surged” in times of crisis.
During the Cold War, U.S. membership in NATO provided the U.S. Navy a
built-in alliance with European navies, supported by a formalized command
structure and set doctrine and procedures. In the post–Cold War era, NATO
nations have reduced their defense spending and have reduced their naval forces
significantly. Moreover, the locus of potential major-power conflict has shifted
to the Middle East and East Asia. Outside of defense pacts with Japan, with its
growing navy, and South Korea and Australia, the United States has little in the
way of formal arrangements that would underpin joint naval operations. However, nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and even Vietnam possess small
but potentially significant navies and strategic geography that could be valuable
to the United States in the event of conflict with China. Similarly, a variety of nations in the Persian Gulf region possess both navies and geography of potential
utility to the United States if war with Iran breaks out. However, without an alliance structure like NATO’s, the framework for and details of cooperation either
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/5
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must be ad-libbed in crisis (surging trust and confidence) or, preferably, worked
out deliberately in peacetime.
Most nations not bound into an alliance, while happy to conduct joint training
with the U.S. Navy, are not anxious to commit to an a priori anti-Iran or antiChina alliance. However, as Iranian and Chinese aggressiveness build over time,
the United States needs to weave together as many threads of a naval coalition
as possible, both to enhance deterrence and to complicate potential opponents’
military operations. This fabric must be woven, per the logic of the 2007 CS21,
gradually over time. Familiarity and confidence that would lead to close cooperation in the event of war are never givens; each state will act according to its
sovereign interests. However, routine and iterative engagement on peacetime
missions such as maritime security helps increase the odds that effective cooperation at higher levels on the spectrum of conflict will emerge more effectively and
in a more timely manner.
ENGAGEMENT AS A COMPONENT OF FLEET DESIGN
There are various reasons for a navy to want as many ships as it can get. The traditional and obvious reason is to outnumber a potential enemy in whatever class
of ship is regarded as the “counting unit” of seapower. This increases the odds of
victory in case of war, and thus also presumably enhances deterrence. However,
if fewer ships can be had, then each one, under this logic, ought to be as powerful
as possible. This approach makes perfect sense if the key to national security is
the ability to win a decisive naval battle. Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated such a
strategy, and in the geopolitical conditions of his day it made sense. It also makes
sense if one’s ships individually decisively outclass any capability any potential
enemy could bring to bear. This has been the case with American aircraft carriers up until the last decade or so. They could approach virtually any shore with
impunity and use their embarked airpower to deter or defeat local aggression.
However, as they have become fewer in number and threats to them have become
more credible, the logic of trading numbers for capability is starting to fray.
Another reason for having numerous ships is to be able to bring power and
influence to bear in multiple locations at the same time. Since its founding, the
United States routinely has dispersed naval forces around the globe to protect its
commercial and political interests. Most often, this aspect of naval strategy has
not required powerful forces, only individual ships or small squadrons. On the
other hand, during the Cold War, the United States needed powerful forces for
routine forward presence at multiple locations around Eurasia, and so maintained
at least fifteen carrier battle groups. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the
compelling reason to have so many groups, and the number has shrunk gradually to eleven. There are still reasons to have powerful groups forward, but eleven
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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carriers is not enough to use them as the default presence platform in a strategically comprehensive manner.
The 9/11 attacks produced a new kind of naval dispersion requirement: global
maritime security. To protect America’s homeland and those of allies and friends
from terrorist smuggling via the sea, the entire maritime environment has to be
secured. As previously stated, the 2007 CS21 provided the basis for securing the
international naval cooperation needed to attain comprehensive maritime security. Beyond the interaction of individuals in symposia such as the International
Seapower Symposium (ISS) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, international war games, and personnel exchanges, the Navy found itself conducting
large numbers of port visits in areas it normally had not frequented, such as the
littoral of Africa, to increase the capabilities of smaller navies and reinforce commitment and resolve. Initially the Navy conducted such engagements with its
combatants and amphibious ships, but experience indicated that these smaller
navies felt intimidated by such ships, so the Navy took to using smaller vessels,
such as the catamaran high-speed vessel (HSV). This was at least a partial validation of Vice Admiral Morgan’s “3/1” strategy.
While Al Qaeda may have been crippled over the past fifteen years, it still
maintains some capability. The rise of the Islamic State and the continuing viability of the Taliban indicate that maritime security is a strategic naval mission
that cannot be taken for granted. While enormous gains in the development of a
global maritime security partnership have been made, the structure is informal
and voluntary, and so requires continuous effort to keep it going; and because it
is not yet globally comprehensive, work is needed to bring more navies into the
framework. While individual and organizational engagement constitutes a large
part of the effort, ship visits and joint exercises are still required, and these missions demand a fleet of vessels tailored to the job, in both character and number.
Given the potential strategic damage that an attack—say, a biological one—from
the sea could cause, or the impact on the economy of shutting down air traffic
after an airliner has been brought down by a smuggled man-portable surface-toair missile, maritime security is an inherent and critical component of the Navy’s
strategic mission portfolio, and therefore a necessary component of fleet design.
Cooperation on maritime security is based on a shared unity of purpose
among nations. As former Colombian CNO Admiral Guillermo Barrera has said,
“Any nation that benefits from the sea has a responsibility to help secure it.”8 That
unity of purpose is based on the notion that globalization has created a world
economic system in which every nation has a stake. But the system is subject to
any number of threats and disruptions, ranging from maritime piracy to majorpower war. In theory, missions involving defense of the system that occur at any
level of the layer cake become a responsibility of all nations, contributing as each
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/5
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is able. Such an attitude is strategically important to the United States in its efforts
both to secure its coasts and to deter aggression by “rogues” and near peers. This
attitude was evinced to some extent during the Korean War, when twenty-two nations joined the United Nations Command in one way or another. The argument
advanced by this article is that such cooperation can be made more likely and
more widespread in the maritime realm by constant engagement and cooperation on maritime security, disaster relief, and a host of other peacetime missions.
The linkage between routine maritime security work and higher levels of conflict can be illustrated by a notional example. In the South China Sea there are
numerous overlapping territorial claims. Currently China is building artificial
islands to create military bases to back up its extensive—and illegal—claims.
Southeast Asian nations mostly have small coastal navies that are unable to operate very far out at sea for very long. One method of maritime security cooperation
in the capacity-building realm would be for the U.S. Navy to configure one of its
San Antonio–class amphibious transport docks (LPDs) to function as a mother
ship or sea base for Philippine, Vietnamese, Bruneian, and other navies’ patrol
craft to build experience and confidence operating to the limit of their claimed
exclusive economic zones. Routine operations by a number of nations inside
contested waters could complicate the politics for China; China’s scope for easy
expansionism would become more limited if such operations stimulated the
confidence of Southeast Asian nations and resulted in their developing greater
war-at-sea capabilities.
A governing concept of engagement is to avoid the perception that the United
States simply is attempting to drag other nations into its own quarrels or to advance its own parochial strategic interests. This was a perception problem for
the Navy in 2003–2006 as it attempted to secure international maritime security
cooperation in the wake of the Iraq invasion. The United States was seen as an interventionist power pursuing its own agenda, and this interfered with the ability
of international naval leaders to develop closer ties with the U.S. Navy or to buy
into the notion of global maritime security cooperation. The 2007 CS21 was able
to reverse that perception both by involving a range of international navies in its
development and through its inclusion of (1) the key concepts of defense of the
global system; (2) the statement that preventing wars is as important as winning
them; and (3) the framework of globally deployed, mission-tailored forces for
engagement.9 Efforts such as Secretary Carter’s to curtail engagement capability
(through reducing the buy of LCSs) to enhance war-fighting posture run counter
to that concept.
The U.S. Navy’s latest strategy document, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready” (CS21R), is supposed to be a “refresh” to the 2007 CS21. However, in this writer’s view, it is a completely different
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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document with different purposes. Whatever the new document’s virtues with
respect to its intended purpose (and there are many), some of its language is at
cross-purposes with the intent of its predecessor and could undermine the Navy’s
efforts to engender increased levels of international naval cooperation. This concern will not be readily apparent to most who read the new document, as it does
contain language that calls for such cooperation.10 However, several sections of
the document contain statements such as “Enhance the ability to command and
control operations to project power from the sea in contested environments,
including interoperability with partner nations.”11 There is good reason for the
U.S. Navy to try to achieve interoperability with other navies for high-end combat
operations, but CS21R does not distinguish clearly between cooperation for maritime security and cooperation in combat. Other navies will parse the document
closely, looking for hidden agendas. Conflating all naval cooperation functions
from low end to high end will spark suspicions that the United States will try to
drag international navies into wars in which their nations do not want to participate. This was precisely the problem Admiral Mullen faced back in 2005–2006
as he attempted to put together the “thousand-ship navy” for maritime security
purposes. It took the indirect approach of the 2007 CS21 to allay those fears.
This article contends that expanded engagement at lower levels of the engagement layer cake will enhance, over time, the prospects for wider participation in
higher-tiered missions. However, the process requires patience, commitment,
and continuity over time to generate trust and confidence. Establishing a sense
of unity of purpose is critical, and focus on the lower tiers is the most promising
way to get that process started. As it evolves, work on training and equipping for
higher-tiered missions can be undertaken as other countries and their navies become politically ready for such moves. Of course, the U.S. Navy already conducts
extensive engagement activities around the world; the issue is how future fleet
design will affect the process.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is, of course, simply not the case that the Navy’s high-end power should be designed on the basis of a bottom-up application of the global naval layer cake concept. However, as the Navy gets smaller even as its global commitments remain
constant or even increase, and as the cost of high-end combat units escalates, the
Navy has to find relief somewhere. Forward-basing schemes and blue/gold crewing concepts require various regional nations to agree to allow the U.S. Navy to
establish at least temporary facilities in their territories. At the very least, application of the naval engagement layer cake theory could facilitate the statesmanship
needed to obtain such permission. Success along this line of effort would result
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in more forward combat power at key locations. But this is more in the way of
expressing a desired outcome than a recipe for implementation.
An obvious first step is for the Navy, via some new strategy document, to acknowledge the importance of engagement work and to counteract any suspicions
raised by CS21R. This would be not so much a sop to foreign navies as a course
change to the internal culture of the Navy. Here again, quite obviously, the foundation of the Navy ethos is war fighting and the warrior. However, given the long,
glorious history of the Navy executing both strategic functions, the ethos of the
naval warrior and that of the naval diplomat can exist side by side, with neither
diluting the other. A new document must be developed with a clear understanding of its purpose and its intended audience. It should distinguish clearly among
the levels of naval cooperation and avoid language that could be interpreted as
default U.S. presumptions of other nations’ policies in particular sets of circumstances. Despite its many strengths, CS21R contains such language.
As a midshipman and junior officer, I was taught that a naval officer is capable of performing literally any task that might come along—sort of a glorious
amateur, in the Royal Navy tradition. And in fact, I have witnessed naval officers
of all designators performing brilliantly in positions and situations way outside
their backgrounds and training. That said, if the Navy is to take the engagement
function seriously, it should have a cadre of personnel who can build progressive
professional experience over time, allowing them to perform in a more sophisticated manner than would be possible on a one-tour basis. It does not seem necessary to establish a new designator when the Navy has at its disposal the existing
foreign area officer (FAO) program. This program could be modified to include
enlisted personnel and involve progressive assignments that would include mission command of partnership stations and perhaps command of HSVs or other
ships that are most appropriate for engagement missions. A full definition of the
engagement function could include designated flag billets, providing a viable
promotion path for FAOs.
The big question in the minds of many is whether the Navy ought to divert
shipbuilding and other programmatic resources to the engagement mission.
The fear of those who regard such work as collateral is that any such diversion
of resources will reduce unwisely the number of combatants the Navy has—a
legitimate fear in a highly constrained budget environment. There are two ways
of addressing this concern. First, as it happens, the Navy already has made a program decision to procure a number of HSVs for logistic work, and already they
have proved useful as platforms for various partnership station initiatives in Latin
America and Africa. They are relatively cheap and the Navy is getting double use
from them, as both a useful logistic platform and a useful engagement platform.
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In the future, the Navy might get an additional use from them if a variety of antiship and other missiles are containerized. The HSVs could become lethal combatants for specific purposes in specific areas under the emerging “distributed
lethality” concept.12
There is also the matter of day-to-day execution of the layer cake theory. All
the sea services must work together to make the process yield results. Wide dispersion of forces is necessary to conduct the engagement that widens the lower
layers, but even with full Navy buy-in of the engagement function, ships and other
resources still will be relatively scarce. A strategy must be developed for focusing
resources where they will do the most good on a global basis. Not long after the
issuance of the 2007 CS21, the Navy established the Global Engagement Strategy
Division (N52), which was supposed to do that very thing. However, despite a
good start, it was populated subsequently with desk officers whose purpose was
to prepare the CNO for foreign engagements, thus changing the division’s focus
from planning to execution. The Navy’s current force-distribution strategy is to
“satisfice” combatant commander (COCOM) demands as best it can, but there is
no global vision behind this, since each COCOM is interested almost exclusively
in conditions in his theater. Most recently, the Navy’s “supply side” deployment
scheme is based on availability of forces rather than strategy, and is receiving pushback from the COCOMs.13 The Navy must rehabilitate the strategydevelopment function of N52 so it can arm the CNO with arguments for force
distribution that may not accord with COCOM requests for forces.
Normally, engagement is regarded as what forward-deployed forces do on a
day-to-day peacetime basis. However, there is more to it. Foreign naval officers
attend U.S. Navy education and training courses, and any number of naval training and education activities are undertaken in foreign countries. These are relatively inexpensive measures compared with ship visits and exercises. The Navy
ought to take more advantage of its shore establishment, especially by including
such activities in its global engagement strategy. Clearly, such activities must be
coordinated with COCOM theater security cooperation plans and policies, but—
unlike the distribution of forces afloat—the Navy has near-definitive authority
for planning and executing them. Part of this branch of global naval engagement
is the biennial ISS held at the Naval War College. Increasing attendance since
the issuance of the 2007 CS21 has been an indicator of the health of the global
maritime security partnership. In 2009–11, then-CNO Gary Roughead linked
international war gaming conducted by the Naval War College to the ISS, with
significant benefit. This linkage ought to be renewed, and a strategy for using the
ISS to advance maritime security cooperation developed.
Finally, even if the Navy leverages the FAO corps for leadership in the engagement function, the operant element of Navy culture is that diplomacy and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/5

NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb 28

10

9/15/16 12:47 PM

Rubel: The Relationship between Global Naval Engagement and Naval War-Fi

RU B E L

29

engagement are everybody’s business, from seaman to admiral. In the day-today process of honing the Navy’s combat prowess, care should be taken to avoid
presumptions that foreign navies might construe as arrogance. This is part and
parcel of Theodore Roosevelt’s admonition that the United States should speak
softly but carry a big stick. The Navy is precisely the big stick Roosevelt had in
mind, but without deft international statesmanship on the part of all naval officers and sailors, that stick becomes increasingly brittle. To secure maximum
international cooperation in times of crisis and war, patient, steady attention to
the engagement function in peacetime will pay dividends. This is the connection
between maritime security and naval war fighting.
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